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The present study focuses on certain critical aspects of the agricultural modernization, 
in the course of implementation of the investment aid scheme in Greece. Although the 
investments made under the scheme, contributed to the significant reorganization of the 
farms as well as to employment creation, serious deficiencies were detected in the way 
the scheme has been designed and implemented: lack of programming logic serving 
specific targets and of suitable mechanisms for information and back-up of farmers on 
technico-organizational matters, as well as non-incorporation of the principles of pro-
gramming, monitoring and assessment. The way the scheme was implemented, exempli-
fies the subventionist logic of income assistance, and underlines some standing charac-
teristics in Greek agricultural policy. Finally, alternative priorities of investment policy 
application are examined. 
 




In the long and changing course of the Common Agricultural Policy, investment aid 
to private farms is considered a basic means for achieving the structural modernization 
of European agriculture. The real improvement of the efficiency of structures of Euro-
pean agriculture is pursued through submission and approval of a detailed investment 
plan (also known as “Improvement Plan”) (EC 1972; 1975).  
Incentives to farmers whose Improvement Plans have been approved include the 
granting of assistance in the form of either interest rate subsidies or capital grant aid. 
Aid is granted in particular for investments aimed at reorganizing and improving the 
quality of production, cutting production costs, promoting diversification of farm activi-
ties, improving working and living conditions of farmers and improving the well-being 
of animals (EC, 1991). The investment aid scheme has also been used for the achieve-
ment of more specific objectives such as the “agri-environmental incentives” of Article 
19 in Regulation 797/85 or Articles 21-24 in Regulation 2328/91 (EC, 1985; IEEP, 
1993). Historically, the scheme has focused on a wide range of objectives, giving to 
Member States the ability to choose the desirable set of priorities (Agra Ceas, 2003). 
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From 1988 onwards, the private investment aid scheme (thereinafter: ‘the scheme’), 
constituted an inseparable element of the policies exercised through the Structural 
Funds, on the purportedly self-evident assumption that the reform principles of the latter 
would naturally also apply for the former, as for the other schemes for aiding private 
investment. Since 1999 and the promulgation of Regulation 1257/99, private investment 
aid to agriculture has been organically integrated into overall EU rural development pol-
icy (EC, 1999).  
The present study focuses attention on certain crucial aspects of the scheme for pro-
viding investment aid to Greek agriculture. Following a summary analysis of the 
scheme’s implementation in Greece, the theoretical framework is outlined and analyzed 
in detail. Finally, discussion of the findings and certain observations are put forward by 
way of conclusion.  
 
 
Implementation of the aid scheme in Greece 
Private investment aid in Greek agriculture, through submission, approval and im-
plementation of a specific plan providing a detailed description of the types of invest-
ment and quantifying the anticipated improvement in the functioning of the farm, is a 
practice first appeared in Greece at the beginning of the ’80s. It was implemented as na-
tional policy in the 1983-84 biennium, in the course of which 24,080 improvement 
plans were approved, with an average level of investment of 0.23 million drachmas and 
average proportion of subsidy of 24%. 
The first quantitative and qualitative departures from past practice were registered in 
the context of implementation of Directive 72/159: in 1983 and 1984, 148 development 
plans were submitted, 95 of which gained approval (an approval rate of 64%), with an 
average investment level of 5.1 million drachmas and subsidy corresponding to 38% of 
overall investment (GMA, 1999). 
Systematic implementation of the policy in question dates from 1986, with the intro-
duction of Regulation 797/85. In some years since then, particularly the period from 
1993 to 1995 there have been significant falls in the number of improvement plans be-
ing submitted, while from 1996 onwards, and particularly in 1997, the upward trend re-
commences. It is considered that the basic reasons for this downturn in farm investment 
activity are the ten percent fall in subsidies to the various categories of investment after 
1-1-1992, high interest rates on medium-term loans at the Agricultural Bank of Greece 
during the period in question and an increase in the costs of investment (Tsiboukas et al 
2000).  
At the same time the state budget often encountered difficulties in securing national 
participation in the relevant investment outlay on account of the high fiscal deficits. As 
a result, in the context of the efforts to reduce the high rate of inflation and put a brake 
on public deficits and debt, from 1985 onwards, tight credit policies were pursued by 
Greek governments. Because of these austerity policies and also because of overborrow-
ing by a significant proportion of farms, from the beginning of the nineties onwards a 
falling tendency was to be seen in the granting of medium-term loans in the farming 
sector (Baltas, 1998). 
Increase in the proportion of subsidy after 1-1-1996 and a more general improvement 
in the macro-economic figures for the Greek economy resulted, among other things, in a 
turnaround in the climate, accompanied by an acceleration in the rate of implementation 2007, Vol 8, No 1  39 
and completion of investment plans, without that solving however the basic problem of 
disinvestment that for years had been one of Greek agriculture’s distinguishing features. 
It is worth noting that the average level of investment in approved plans between the 
first and second Community Support Framework (CSF) increased from 3.8 to 5.1 mil-
lion drachmas (in 1988 prices), while the average proportion of subsidy in the approved 
investment plans rose from 40% to 44% (GMA, 1997).  
The basic findings for investments provided with aid under the scheme were as fol-
lows (Tsiboukas et al. 2002): 
−  they covered a large proportion of farm requirements for provision and replace-
ment/modernization of mechanical equipment, 
−  they made a decisive contribution to increasing the area of irrigated farmland and 
introducing of electrification, 
−  they significantly contributed to promoting greenhouse cultivation, 
−  they facilitated efforts by farms to differentiate their activities and secure additional 
income through construction of agrotourist accommodation, 
−  three quarters of the sums invested were channeled into plant production, with ani-
mal production absorbing only 15% of the relevant funding. 
−  In 1994, 37 percent of supported holdings used the investment to re-orientate their 
production. 
The scheme undoubtedly constitutes a strategic tool for modernization of the produc-
tive procedure, by promoting mechanization and irrigation. But no effort is made to di-
rect farms receiving assistance towards non-surplus branches of production. Instead, 
there is perpetuation of an orientation towards production within a type of farming 
whose competitiveness is being progressively eroded.  
 
 
Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
 Programming, monitoring and assessment are the three basic principles of the re-
form of the Structural Funds, introduced through Regulation 2052/88 and which should 
encompass all the separate structural policies of the EU (EC, 1988). Questions have 
arisen, as to how far the institutional framework of the investment aid scheme has in-
corporated the principles in question (Court of Auditors, 1990).  
The reply to this criticism starts from the argument that the principles, the objectives 
and the terms of implementation of the scheme are precise, while on the other hand the 
details should maintain the necessary flexibility, taking into account the special charac-
teristics of the different EU regions (reply of the European Commission to criticism 
from the Court of Auditors) (Court of Auditors, ibid). Under these arrangements the EU 
is confined to setting the goals and the principles governing the aid grant, leaving it to 
the national and regional authorities to decide on the basis of Community criteria the 
precise form of the intervention and implementation of the rulings. 
On the other hand, from the early 1970s onward, the question of providing invest-
ment aid to agriculture was seen as inextricably linked to accomplishment of a concrete 
income-policy goal on the part of the agricultural holding. The basic motivation behind 
Directive 72/159 was selective application of investment incentives (Article 1.1) (EC, 
1972), implying obviously that there was a need for targeting of structural policies in AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW  40 
agriculture. This requirement was however evaded through member-countries’ practice 
of also granting investment aid to farmers who were not in a position to reach compara-
ble income levels (Fennel, 1997). It had been envisaged that the selectiveness in ques-
tion would be implemented regionally also; member-states were free to administer fi-
nancial aid for investments in a differentiated manner and not to make available some 
grants at all, obviously so as to be able to focus their efforts on the regions with the 
greatest needs. 
This kind of targeting was never practised at the Community level, the policies in 
question following an undifferentiated logic of making no distinctions between the vari-
ous types of farms in relation to the achievement of some income-related objective; in 
reality from a certain point onward all agricultural holdings could be considered eligible 
to carry out an Improvement Plan (Tracy, 1993). The only distinction that was imple-
mented in practice was that between the different proportions of subsidization by type 
of investment and by region (Less Favoured Areas [LFAs] and other areas). 
As far as the agricultural policies implemented by Greek governments is concerned, 
it is worth mentioning that in the 1980s the practice of continual increases in income 
subsidies predominated, at a time when the productive performance of Greek agriculture 
was stagnant and no effort was being made to improve its international competitiveness 
(Louloudis and Maraveyas, 1997). Both the ‘farmer-friendly’ policies and the state cor-
poratism that predominated in the farming sector were the key elements of the overall 
agricultural policy followed at this period. The basic consequence of this way of imple-
menting farm policy was contraction, in real terms, of the structural expenditures for 
agriculture, which from 4.3% of the overall farm output between 1974 and 1980 fell to 
4.0% between 1981 and 1989, while during the same period expenditures of an income-
related kind increased from 13.8% to 35.0% of total farm output. Greek agricultural 
policies, therefore, were chiefly income-oriented in character, placing emphasis on sub-
sidizing the volume of production, and not enhancing the necessary structural adjust-
ments.  
It has also been claimed that particularly after the mid-90s Greek agricultural policy 
underwent a change in character, abandoning the ‘farmer-friendly’ policies of the previ-
ous decade, and shifting the emphasis to modernization of Greek agriculture through 
timely institutional and structural interventions (Louloudis and Maraveyas, ibid).  
Within the framework mentioned above, certain critical issues of considerable impor-
tance emerge. They have to do mainly with the policy of farm modernization and are 
questions the present paper proposes to examine. First and foremost, to what extent has 
the investment aid scheme incorporated the basic principles of reform of the Structural 
Funds? Secondly, how is the scheme integrated into the dominant practices of Greek 
agricultural policy? Thirdly, what would in reality mean for the developmental model of 
Greek agriculture the setting of certain priorities concerning the implementation of the 
scheme? This question is examined on the basis of two alternative definitions of the tar-
get population, i.e. those who, in priority terms, would be the potential beneficiaries of 
the scheme. Finally, what recommended framework emerges – what axes emerge – for 
investment policy? 
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The scheme in relation to Structural Funds policies 
In the following text there is an examination of how far the three principles of reform 
of the Structural Funds are incorporated into the investment aid scheme in Greece. At-
tention focuses on the planning and implementation of the scheme during the second 
programming period (1994-1999). The scheme under examination was, along with the 
‘Young Farmers’ and ‘Compensatory Allowances’ schemes, included in measure 1.1 of 
the Agriculture Ministry’s Operational Program ‘Development in the Agricultural Sec-
tor 1994-99’. 
The first finding has to do with absence of clear programmatic logic. Failure to pro-
vide concrete specification of obligations and final budget at the action level resulted, 
for example, in the scheme (like the other two schemes) being implemented in a ‘slack’ 
manner. No sums were allocated at the regional and prefectural level, so no need was 
perceived to grade or prioritize potential beneficiaries in the event that the amount of 
funding available was insufficient to cover all the investment plans approved. Similarly, 
there was no attempt to arrange distribution of available funds in a way that would op-
timize returns on investment and/or secure the best prospects for further farming devel-
opment. 
Another significant absence was that of clear functional, sectoral and geographic pri-
orities, making impossible an integrated and comprehensive evaluation of the scheme. 
Note that this type of programming is essentially different from the corresponding or-
ganization of farm product processing and marketing, where in each particular case the 
sums approved are checked against the budget, a ceiling is established for each region, 
and sectoral and functional priorities are established (AUA, 2002).  
In any case, in the course of implementation of the program, serious planning defi-
ciencies were detected, not the least of which was underestimation of the unit cost of 
each Improvement Plan. This led to corrective adjustments in the course of implementa-
tion of the program, at the level of both goals (change of physical object) and financial 
obligations. The factors contributing to the increase in cost per investment plan were on 
the one hand a rise in prices for investment goods and on the other increased borrowing 
by farmers, by virtue of improvement in the macro-economic figures for the Greek 
economy. A significant role was also played by administrative decisions to increase the 
proportion of subsidy on investments by 10% after 1996. Thus the unit cost ultimately 
emerged at a level around 15% higher than originally projected.  
The result was that the initial goal of 50,000 Improvement Plans was soon adjusted 
downwards to 30,000, an objective which was ultimately over-fulfilled, while the final 
budget for Measure 1.1 was 25% higher than originally planned, with a corresponding 
15% increase in the Operational Program for Agriculture. It is thus to Measure 1.1, and 
specifically to the scheme being examined here, that one must attribute the fiscal dis-
equilibrium of the overall Operational Program and the relative failure of initial plan-
ning to properly estimate the cost of covering the needs of the Program. 
The resources available for implementation of the scheme were thus exhausted by 
August 1999, while enrolment of would-be beneficiaries was continuing at an undimin-
ished rate. This resulted in a serious problem of budget overrun and Program over-
indebtedness. Emerging conspicuously in 1999, the problem of over-absorption proved 
insuperable despite successive increases in the overall Program budget. Continuous 
pressure was generated for the necessary funding to be found and a significant propor-
tion of it was eventually covered by the Greek national budget. AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW  42 
One of the consequences of the above was perpetuation of the problem of burdening 
of the Operational Program for Agriculture during each programming period with tasks 
deriving from legal obligations contracted during the previous period: Measure 1.1 of 
the 1994-1999 Operational Program for Agriculture was charged with 17.5 million Ecus 
from the corresponding measure of the 1988-1993 Operational Program for Agriculture 
(32.8 million Ecus for the total of the Operational Program for Agriculture) and imposes 
a corresponding charge of 250 million Euros on the equivalent measure in the 2000-
2006 Operational Program (AUA 2002). 
One key problem is inability to specify to what extent the objectives of the scheme 
have been fulfilled. As indicated, the aims of the Regulation can be summed up as in-
crease in Farm Income (central quantitative goal) and a total of eight separate additional 
quality- and quantity-related goals, such as for example reduction in production costs, 
diversification of farm activities, protection of the environment, etc. In reality, however, 
through the Improvement Plans the only goal to which there can be a quantitative ap-
proach is increase of Farm Income (Farm Labor Income per Annual Work Unit) (EC, 
1997). Therefore, from the way the Improvement Plans are compiled it is not possible 
for the performance of one farm to be determined in relation to the totality of scheme’s 
objectives. 
Retrospective auditing of the scheme’s implementation at prefectural level is also 
impossible because no prior distribution of funds to be absorbed takes place at that 
level. 
The consequences of the above for the Program process should be obvious. The pro-
cedure for proper monitoring of implementation of the scheme and evaluation of its re-
sults is annulled, there being no way of determining to what extent goals have been at-
tained, how much consistency there is between ends and means, how suitable is the 
strategy being pursued, etc. This means that in reality the scheme has not managed to 
incorporate the three basic principles of the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988, that 
is to say programming, monitoring and assessment. A question therefore arises as to 
how one of the most important elements of structural policies in farming is being inte-
grated into the overall policy framework as implemented through the Structural Funds. 
 
 
How the scheme relates to Greek agricultural policies in practice 
From available statistics it emerges that around half of the total number of approved 
Improvement Plans received approval in the last two years and around one third just in 
the last year of the second programming period (Table 1). Apart from the improvement 
in the macro-economic environment of the Greek economy and the anxiety of many 
farmers to gain entry to the scheme before the – at that time rumoured – change in the 
whole system of investment aid subsidies, the basic factor accounting for this ‘boom’ in 
Improvement Plan approvals is the fact that 1999 was a pre-election year
1. The worsen-
ing of the economic situation of many farmers following the reductions in institutional 
prices on account of the reforms of the CAP in 1992 adversely affected farm incomes 
thereafter. The existence of schemes for economic aid to be available to farmers and 
also consonant with the new restrictive framework of the CAP was incorporated to the 
patronage-based political system and served as an instrument for the government’s pre-
electoral policies, given that authority over distribution of resources at the prefectural 
level belongs exclusively to the Ministry for Agriculture. The investment aid is an ex-2007, Vol 8, No 1  43 
ample par excellence of this type of measure. It was this distribution, which as previ-
ously indicated does not follow any strict programmatic logic, that finally determined 
the number of Improvement Plans to be implemented following approval.  
To some extent political, again, was the decision to continue approval of Improve-
ment Plans after the exhaustion of the program’s resources, throughout the second half 
of 1999, leading the entire Operational Program of the Ministry of Agriculture into seri-
ous fiscal imbalance and related programming errors. However, the most serious conse-
quence was the serious undermining, in fact even largely nullification, of any possibility 
for continuation of the same policy measure (assistance to private farming investments) 
in the third Program period
2. The implications of this problem are obvious, given that 
what we are referring to here is the most important part of the endeavour to achieve 
structural modernization of Greek farming. 
 
Table 1. Improvement Plans during the 2
nd Community Support Framework 








nd CSF   33,277 
Source: Greek Ministry of Agriculture 
 
The institutional framework for implementation of the scheme suffers from signifi-
cant weaknesses, not so much through inherent inadequacies and ambiguities as through 
dependence on a complex bureaucratic framework for its implementation, via an institu-
tionally totally inadequate and defective institutional environment (Papadopoulos, 
1997). Administrative inadequacies and institutional rigidities at the local level, as well 
as the concurrent implementation with price-support policies, were the main reason for 
unsuccess of structural agricultural policies to alleviate structural impediments of the 
agricultural sector (Diakosavvas, 1998).  
Ample documentation is available on the implementation of the whole politics of in-
vestment aid in agriculture in an environment characterized by institutional vagueness 
and arbitrary actions on the part of the engaged scientific and technical personnel em-
ployed in the local departments of rural development (Papadopoulos, 1999). With the 
passage of time a voluminous legislative framework accumulates, difficult of access for 
farmers interested in implementing an Improvement Plan. This significantly strengthens 
the position of the official argonomists at the local level in each Prefectural Agricultural 
Development Directorate, who quite apart from provision of detailed information on 
implementation of the Regulation are also charged with checking and approving the Im-
provement Plans submitted, as well as monitoring the investments of the Plans after 
their implementation. The truth of the matter is that these personnel are not accountable 
to any other official body for the way they run the scheme.  AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS REVIEW  44 
One major problem, and source of a host of malfunctions, is the existence of a range 
of different instances of institutional vagueness in defining basic concepts: concepts 
such as time in farming and off-farming employment, farm operator, existence of the 
farm and operation for a year, adequate professional capacity, three years’ experience 
in farming, not to mention characterizations such as a farmer by primary or secondary 
occupation and place of permanent residence are reiterated by the municipal authorities 
or the co-operative manager on the basis of imaginary criteria and/or non-existent insti-
tutional frameworks (Papadopoulos, 1999).  
Another conspicuous factor is the non-existence of common criteria and methods for 
implementing the scheme in practice
3, drawing into question the reliability both of the 
data included in approved Improvement Plans and of the assessment methods being im-
plemented for the various farm economics statistics at the level of the individual agri-
cultural holding. Crucial in this respect is the role of local extra-institutional networks, 
in which basic protagonists, apart from the would-be investor, are the agronomists draft-
ing the Improvement Plan and the agronomists in the local departments of rural devel-




The absence of targeting and clear priorities in the scheme 
Other critical features of Greek agricultural policies to add to the above list are its 
undifferentiated character and the non-existence of targeting and prioritization in its im-
plementation, since it is supposedly addressed ‘to everyone’ equally. In the present sec-
tion these features will be traced in the method of implementation of the scheme, and an 
attempt is made to define the target population – i.e. the farms which should be priori-
tized in elaboration of private investment aid policies, in quantitative terms. 
Despite the undifferentiated character of the scheme, prevailed at the EU level, the 
need for more precise definition of target populations for agricultural investment aid, 
has also been heard from official sources. For example, faced with the requirement in 
1971 for calculation of product prices in terms of ‘objective’ criteria, the European 
Commission divided agricultural holdings into three categories (EC, 1971): those which 
had incomes equal to or higher than the ‘comparable’ income and were economically 
efficient (Group I), those which were below the level of comparable income but with 
suitable assistance could achieve it (Group II) and holdings not in a position to utilize 
aid for purposes of modernization but whose income was also so low that price policies 
were not appropriate for them (Group III).  
In determining the target population for the purpose of implementing the scheme in 
Greece, it should be taken into consideration that the total number of farms with fully 
employed farmholdings do not exceed 31% of the total, whereas the potentially eco-
nomically efficient farms account for approximately 18% of the total (see Appendix).  
Another worth mentioning element is the fact that three quarters of the Improvement 
Plans so far approved in Greece have been carried out in LFAs (Agricultural University 
of Athens, 2002). Non-LFA agricultural holdings are included in the categories of effi-
cient and potentially efficient with smaller economic and productive sizes than is the 
case with LFAs. This is attributable to the higher factor productivity of the more dy-
namic areas, as compared to the others, testifying on the one hand to the soundness of 
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LFAs and on the other to the utility of granting compensatory allowances in these areas. 
However, the fact that about 48% of the potentially efficient farms are situated in non-
LFAs might call for re-examination of the criteria for inclusion in the scheme, and 
avoidance of misusing the scheme as a classical regional development policy measure.  
 
 
Discussion - Conclusions 
In the course of implementation of the investment aid scheme in Greece certain im-
portant aspects concerning the structural agricultural policies have come to light.  
Although the investments that were made under the scheme undoubtedly had benefi-
cial effects for the farms that carried them out, they all operated strictly within the 
framework of the ‘modernization’ paradigm (mechanization-irrigation). They did how-
ever at the same time provide the farms with the opportunity to go ahead with radical 
reorganization of their production, and even with changes in their technical and eco-
nomic orientation. The modernization in question was not accompanied by loss of em-
ployment positions for people but on the contrary frequently contributed to the creation 
of new jobs. 
From study of the method of planning and application of the scheme it is possible to 
perceive a serious lack of programming logic, with significant secondary consequences. 
Only to a negligible extent have the scheme, and the institutional framework into which 
it is integrated, succeeded in incorporating the three basic principles of the Structural 
Funds of 1988: programming, monitoring and assessment.  
Apart from this, there was also evidence of an extremely serious lack of suitable 
mechanisms for information and backup of farmers on technico-organizational matters, 
and for rationalization and efficiency in investment initiatives. These deficiencies led on 
the one hand to marginalization of the agronomists in the public sector and their relega-
tion to a subaltern role (processing of subsidy monies, etc.) and on the other to a 
strengthening of extra-institutional networks, first and foremost that of the private-
sector agronomists, operating in a murky and ill-defined administrative environment. 
This is even more clearly the case with two other aid schemes: the ‘Young Farmers’ and 
the ‘Compensatory Allowances’.  
The deficiencies and the problems noted here are a product not only of ambiguities in 
the institutional framework of the EU itself and deficiencies in the system of public ad-
ministration in Greece but also of political vested interests, in both the EU and in 
Greece. The way the scheme was implemented, finally, exemplifies the subventionist 
logic of income assistance, i.e. counterbalancing payments made to farmers to compen-
sate for loss of income through falling prices for their products in the wake of the 1992 
reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. In fact the same observation holds for the 
totality of structural policies in European agriculture (Fearne, 1997). The logic appears 
susceptible of extension into the structural part of the CAP, at the expense of drawing 
up and implementation of coherent structural programs and sectoral initiatives. 
Following the 1992 reform of the CAP, the implementation of structural policy in 
Greece faced the following dilemma: it could either move towards a concrete program-
ming logic for the purpose of transforming the structure of the agricultural sector or to 
make the necessary short run adjustments in order to maintain the stability of farm in-
comes. The second choice, which was finally adopted, implied in fact the abandonment 
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the concept of farm efficiency as eligibility criterion for inclusion in the scheme in the 
third programming period could not produce any significant results, since it is applied 
indiscriminately to all farms.  
Up to the end of the second programming period, the most noticeable feature of the 
way the scheme was implemented in Greece was its largely undifferentiated character; 
the non-specification of priorities in implementation of the scheme meant that in prac-
tice the policy in question was addressed to ‘all’ Greek farmers. It is thus arguable that 
this policy was more attuned to the logic of responding to income support demands par-
ticularly in the 1980’s, while supposedly in the 1990s priority was assigned to institu-
tional and structural interventions in Greek agriculture. 
The lack of suitable programming logic serving specific targets coupled with the 
preponderance of price support policies implied that the main beneficiaries of the CAP 
were actually the farms focusing on excess production. Evidently, within this frame-
work the implementation of structural policy could hardly be differentiated on the basis 
of supporting special farm categories as well as certain sectoral or regional priorities. 
Repudiation of certain negative elements of the policies in question presupposes, 
among other things, targeting them, with the focus on endeavours to prioritize assistance 
to the process of transforming potentially efficient farms into efficient ones; Last but not 
least in order of importance is the fact that the type of structural modernization that was 
attempted, although some of its consequences were undoubtedly positive, did not suc-
ceed in moving Greek agriculture into a different developmental trajectory, redefining 




1  A similar chronological imbalance is observed in the “Young Farmers” scheme, with half of 
the total registrations in the 1994-1999 period, taking place in 1999. 
2  As a consequence of these developments, and because of obvious lack of resources, the 
Ministry of Agriculture estimates that in the third programming period the number of Im-
provement Plans carried out will be about one third of the figure approved during the sec-
ond programming period. 
3  For example, up to 1999 at least eight different Improvement Plan forms were being used in 
Greece. 
4The key concept of ‘reference income’ is illustrated by five different figures in a 
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Α. The full-time farm operators 
It is well-known that the existing institutional framework for investment aid to agri-
culture mentions farm holdings whose heads are employed in this sector on an “exclu-
sive full-time basis” (Regulation 2328/91, Article 5 and Regulation 950/97, Article 5) 
(EC, 1991; 1997). Τhe criteria for exclusive full-time employment are on the one hand 
distribution of working time (the farm head must devote at least half of his total work-
ing time to the agricultural holding) and on the other income (the farm head must derive 
from agriculture or other activities on his farm – in forestry, tourist services, light indus-
try, environmental protection – at least half of his total income). 
Given that no reliable figures exist, at the level of the individual farm holding, for 
overall incomes of farm heads in Greece and their allocation as between agricultural and 
non-agricultural, we may limit ourselves to the first of the above-mentioned criteria, 
utilizing data from the 1997 Farm Structures Survey (Eurostat, 1997). More specifically, 
use was made of information from the Survey referring to the distribution of farm heads 
in accordance with the proportion of their overall working time they devoted to their 
farm (Table 2). Obviously categories 50%-75%, 75%-100% and 100% are those that 
include the agricultural holdings potentially entitled within the existing institutional 
framework to benefit from the Regulation.  
There are thus 255,340 (125,690+42,200+87,450) agricultural holdings, 31 percent 
of the total, covered by the Regulation and satisfying, at least theoretically, the criteria 
for inclusion. 
 
Table 2. Full-time and Part-time farm holders 
Working Hours*  Holders 
< 25%  394,460 
25% - <50%  171,420 
50% - <75%  125,690 
75% - <100%  42,200 
100% 87,450 
  Total: 821,220 
(*) Holders’ work in their farms as a percentage of the annual working hours of a full-time worker 
 Source: Eurostat, Farm Structure Survey, 1997 2007, Vol 8, No 1  49 
Given that 33,449 agricultural holdings have been able to take advantage of the in-
vestment aid measure in the second Community Support Framework, it emerges that in 
the second Programming period 13 percent (33,449/255,340) of the country’s poten-
tially eligible holdings joined the scheme. The figure calculated in the same way for the 
period 1989-1999 is 23 percent.  
We conclude, therefore, that during the first and second CSF, around 1/4 of the coun-
try’s potentially eligible farm holdings were integrated into the investment aid mecha-
nism, extending and fundamentally modernizing their productive system, through ap-
proval and implementation of an Improvement Plan. 
 
 
Β. The criterion of economic efficiency (viability) of farms 
Following the aforementioned breakdown of agricultural holdings into three groups, 
a distinction also known as ‘model of the three types of agriculture’, farms are divided 
up, on the basis of the key criterion of prospective economic efficiency (viability), into 
the categories of efficient (Group I), potentially efficient (Group II) and economically 
declining (Group III) (Kroll, 1987; Fennell, 1997). Obviously financial aid should be 
given as a first priority to holdings in the second group, which have the potential to be-
come economically efficient. 
With implementation of this logic in Greek agriculture, in particular the data of 
FADN, the Farm Accountancy Data Network, it emerges that around 20 percent of the 
country’s farms of an economic size exceeding 2 ESU are included in clusters where the 
economic indicators for the average farm holding correspond to the category of effi-
cient, 30 percent to the category of potentially efficient and the remainder (around half 
of the population) to economically declining (Tsiboukas et al. 2002). It should be re-
membered that FADN includes only ‘commercial’ farms, which constitute 60 percent of 
total Greek agricultural holdings but produce around 85% of the total farm product. 
Therefore, farms of the ‘efficient’ category represent 18 percent of the total number of 
Greek farms (30 percent of 60 percent).  
Of course, in the category of efficient agricultural holdings the generation of a satis-
factory level of income is directly linked to the level of subsidy received, which makes a 
contribution of around fifty percent to determining farm income. It is considered ex-
tremely doubtful that this level of viability will be able to be maintained in the event of 
cuts in income support.  
The validity of these findings is qualified insofar as the farms’ non-agricultural in-
come has not been taken into account, but they nevertheless represent a significant step 
towards resolution of a notoriously hazy issue in Greek agriculture.  
 
                                                 
 
 
 